Former French Prime Minister Gabriel Attal has filed a legal complaint alleging foreign interference from Russian-linked networks after a series of deepfakes, fabricated video reports and fake newspaper front pages targeted him and people close to him.
This complaint, filed in Paris on Friday, August 7, represents an unprecedented escalation in a smear campaign that, according to both French officials and independent researchers, was intended to smear Attal ahead of the 2027 French presidential election. Attal is the head of the Renaissance party, which backs incumbent president Emmanuel Macron.
Attal is one of the announced candidates to become the president after Macron can’t seek another consecutive mandate. This legal dispute has gone far beyond ordinary online disinformation. It includes charges of foreign state interference, masquerading as French media brands, and deliberately presenting falsified materials to distort the political climate ahead of the start of official campaigning.
Attal’s lawyers, Sacha Ghozlan and Lucas Veil, revealed that there were multiple accounts on the social network X that have spread false stories that mimic the design and branding of French and international media outlets.
According to the lawyers, the accounts attributed
“propos, des agissements et des positions publiques mensongères et fausses destinées à le discréditer comme candidat”
—“false statements, actions and public positions intended to discredit him as a candidate”—to Attal and his associates.
The complaint followed an initial report made on Wednesday concerning
“external digital interference originating from Russia.”
On Friday, French state services informed Attal’s team about a second operation detected the previous day. His lawyers said both operations were again linked to Russian networks.
Eight fabricated videos targeted Attal
The researchers referred to in writing about the incident claimed that there were eight videos forged in order to look like news items published by the reputable French media outlets. These included BFMTV, RFI, Le Parisien, Agence France-Presse, France 24, Le Figaro, Libération and Le Monde. Besides, the news was not just making vague accusations. Rather, it tried to present them as an independent journalism by adopting the formats of TV news broadcasts, graphics of newspapers, headlines and other elements associated with the work of professional media outlets.
One of the false statements included claims regarding the health problems, family issues, personal life, politics and involvement into the financial scandals of Attal. Some of the videos suggested that he suffered from Parkinson’s disease or took extreme positions when discussing migration and squatters’ issues. In addition, the false statements concerned his father, money transfers from/to Israel and Ukraine and corruption within the aid programs.
Researchers also found false content claiming that Attal had made offensive remarks about Islam, homosexuality and migration. The claims were presented as if they had been exposed by mainstream news organizations or through leaked official documents, although no credible evidence supported them.
The campaign reportedly mixed real biographical details with invented allegations. This is a familiar disinformation technique: genuine facts are used as the foundation for false narratives so that fabricated claims appear more credible to viewers who encounter them without context.
The inclusion of real details can also make fact-checking more difficult. A false video may refer accurately to an individual’s family history, previous public role or a genuine political controversy before adding a fictional quotation or invented scandal. The result is not a completely imaginary story, but a deliberately distorted one.
French authorities link campaign to Matryoshka
The operation was said to be conducted by Matryoshka, a pro-Russian influence group, which had been previously identified by Viginum, an intelligence body responsible for detecting foreign digital interference in France. This agency is responsible for vigilance and protection against foreign digital interference and is based at the General Secretariat for Defence and National Security, or SGDSN. It is tasked with monitoring the impact of foreign digital interference on French political debate. In a Viginum report from 2024, Matryoshka was referred to as a campaign directed at the media and fact-checking outlets. Matryoshka’s method includes fabrication of articles, videos, and images and their spread through anonymous Telegram accounts in the Russian language. It also involves entangling journalists and fact-checkers in the operation.
That structure can create several layers of apparent legitimacy. A fake video is first presented as the work of a recognized media outlet. Anonymous accounts then amplify it, while other accounts ask whether it is genuine. The resulting online discussion can help the content reach a wider audience, even when the material is eventually debunked.
The operation against Attal appears to follow that pattern. The use of recognizable French media identities was intended to exploit the credibility of established journalism while confusing audiences about the source of the material.
However, attribution requires precision. The available evidence supports a high-confidence connection to Matryoshka, but that does not automatically prove that the Russian government directly ordered every individual video or post. The public evidence identifies a Russian-linked influence network; it does not yet publicly establish the identities of all operators, their chain of command or the precise role of Russian state agencies.
Attal warns that France’s election could be stolen
Attal has presented the operation as part of a broader attempt to weaken France’s democratic process. Speaking to RTL, he warned that failure to respond could leave the country vulnerable during the presidential campaign.
“If we do nothing to protect ourselves, the election could be rigged,”
Attal said, according to reports on his comments. He also accused Russia of seeking to “steal” the election from French voters.
However, this choice of language shows how seriously Attal takes the threat posed by this kind of attack, but also poses an interesting question about the difference between interference and manipulation during elections. At the current moment, there are no signs that this fake video campaign had any effect on the voting choices or affected the result of the election in France.
In addition, according to a source of a security service interviewed during reporting, the campaign had a low profile and received several thousand views instead of a wide attack on Attal’s personal equipment or campaign apparatus. However, this does not mean that this campaign is unimportant. Influence operations carried out by foreign actors do not have to influence masses of voters directly. It is enough to pollute the information field and force the candidate to respond to the lies spread, to discredit the role of journalism and the reliability of any political information.
Attal also said he expected the Kremlin to continue such efforts during the campaign. He argued that Russia could try to weaken candidates hostile to its interests while supporting politicians viewed as more favorable to Moscow.
In comments reported after a visit to southern France, Attal said he expected further Russian activity to support Marine Le Pen, the National Rally figure whose political movement has historically taken positions more sympathetic to Russia than those of Attal’s centrist camp.
That accusation is politically significant, but it should be treated as Attal’s assessment rather than an independently proven finding about the Kremlin’s electoral strategy. The operation’s apparent targeting of Attal demonstrates an attempt to damage him; it does not, by itself, prove that a specific rival candidate would benefit or that Russian actors are coordinating directly with that candidate.
Third major candidate targeted in weeks
The case has become part of a wider pattern involving French presidential hopefuls. Édouard Philippe, another former prime minister and centrist figure, and Raphaël Glucksmann, a left-wing European Parliament member and outspoken critic of the Kremlin, have also been targeted in recent weeks.
The reports have highlighted that the three attacks took place within roughly ten days of each other. This has raised more concern on how Russian-backed groups might be assessing their capacity to attack France’s political class ahead of the first round of voting. The choice of the targets is interesting. While Attal, Philippe, and Glucksmann have different roles in French politics, they all share one common link – that of being pro-European institutions, opposed to Russian intimidation and, to varying extents, pro-Ukraine. In addition, the campaigns seem to be tailored to exploit the weaknesses of each candidate. False stories about personal health conditions, fake family dramas, false financial connections, and fabricated quotations are all meant for different audiences.
At the same time, the poor quality of some of the material has limited its immediate impact. Analysts quoted by Le Monde said many of the false items were implausible, attracted little attention and were unlikely to influence the wider public debate. Some content was written in English despite targeting a French politician, an indication of the operation’s crude or automated character.
Yet low-quality content can still serve a strategic purpose. It may be used to provoke reactions, test platform moderation, identify which allegations generate engagement or pressure politicians into repeating the false claims while denying them.
France considers tougher legal response
Attal’s allegation comes in light of the French efforts to introduce new regulations on foreign influence and massive disinformation campaigns in elections. A proposal in the French Senate would tackle deliberate dissemination of false or misleading information in a massive, artificial or automated manner and which poses a threat to national interests or proper democratic processes. It introduces urgent judicial mechanisms to take down such information in case of emergency. This proposal is based on a dilemma which faces democratic governments. The government should be in a position to react promptly in the event of use of fabricated information to disrupt an election but such an emergency power could pose threats to freedom of speech, political criticism and investigation journalism. The example from the Attal case proves the importance of definition in law. False political information does not necessarily constitute a case of foreign influence. A political actor in the domestic political arena, a satirical individual or a political activist could spread false information without being engaged in any foreign influence operation.
Attal’s complaint could help investigators determine whether the accounts were centrally managed, whether they shared technical infrastructure, how the videos were produced and whether the operators had links to previously identified Matryoshka accounts.
Why the operation matters before 2027
The first round of France’s presidential election will take place on April 18, 2027, with the second round on May 2. The election is still some months away; however, recent incidents show that attempts to influence the process through foreign interventions have begun long before reaching the apex of the election campaign. This is important since disinformation at an earlier stage would already create narratives prior to the time when the candidates develop enough defenses to combat this.
A story made up at an early date could later be brought up during a live broadcast debate or spread by local political agents as a controversy. The fabrication of newspapers using front-page articles is especially relevant in France, where the reputations of newspapers still carry a lot of weight.
Deepfakes add another layer of risk. Unlike a written rumor, a convincing video can appear to show a candidate speaking in his own voice and manner. Even when viewers later learn that the footage was manipulated, the initial impression may remain. This is commonly described as the “continued influence” effect: corrections may not fully erase the first exposure to a false claim.
The immediate effect of the Attal operation appears limited, and no evidence has established that it has changed French public opinion. But the campaign has already achieved one result: foreign interference has become a political issue in its own right, forcing candidates, security agencies, media organizations and lawmakers to debate how France should protect the integrity of its next election.
