A deal that might be the first official step toward expanding French nuclear deterrence over central Europe in this new era of US unpredictability will be signed by French and Polish leaders on Friday. On Europe Day, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and French President Emmanuel Macron will sign the Treaty of Nancy. It will solidify a reconciliation between two nations that have spent the majority of the previous thirty years at odds inside the EU.
The primary causes of the tense relationship were France’s desire for collaboration with Russia and its lack of enthusiasm for EU expansion. Poles still resent Jacques Chirac’s statement that the nations of central Europe that supported the 2003 war with Iraq had “missed a good opportunity to shut up” and had acted terribly.
Poland has traditionally opposed any EU involvement in defense and has solely depended on the US and NATO for its security. But in an attempt to increase security, Tusk is hurrying to forge deeper relations with Paris, Berlin, and London as Donald Trump seeks reconciliation with Russia, Poland’s bitterest adversary, and is prepared to allow Moscow to win in Ukraine and lessen US military exposure in Europe.
When Macron offered European allies a nuclear deterrence conversation following Trump’s initial shock disengagement signals, Tusk was quick to react favorably. The treaty of Nancy will promise closer cooperation in a number of areas related to the ultra-sensitive nuclear field, including air forces, air-to-air refueling, air and missile defense, and artillery, without defining how France might use its small atomic arsenal to protect Poland and other eastern EU members.
Although agreements may not be finalized until later in the year, Poland is negotiating the purchase of passenger aircraft and military tanker aircraft from Airbus, as well as perhaps submarines. The EU’s Lisbon Treaty, which states that each nation has “an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power” in the event of an attack, is echoed in the language on mutual defense. Poland would have preferred a clear reference to nuclear power.
Warsaw has not abandoned US nuclear defense as a result of this. In addition, it is trying to join NATO’s nuclear sharing program, which allows a few European allies without nuclear weapons to store US warheads on their territory and use planes designed to transport them if the alliance so chooses. For this purpose, at least 20 US nuclear weapons are in the possession of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and Turkey.
Poland has been trying to join the group for almost ten years, but they haven’t gotten far. Diplomats from the US and Western Europe have long feared that such a move would escalate tensions with Russia and bring nuclear storage facilities too near the eastern European border, which may increase pressure for early deployment in the case of an attack.
Historically, France has kept its force de frappe (strike force) completely independent. It does not take part in the nuclear planning group of NATO, where the United States, the United Kingdom, and other allies discuss strategy, training, and the use of these ultimate weapons. However, Trump’s unpredictable behavior and uncertainty about his readiness to protect NATO partners from Russian aggression have compelled European countries to reconsider their security presumptions and look for alternatives in the event that the US and NATO are unavailable.
The majority of France’s 290 nuclear weapons, which are based on submarines that are constantly patrolling under the waters, will never be shared. No European committee can have his finger on the button; only Monsieur le Président can. But Paris continues to give clues that it is willing to open its arms to allies in Europe. It would require more expensive warheads and launchers than it now has in order to do it convincingly. To assist France in increasing its defense budget, European co-finance or some sort of trade-off may be necessary.
It has never sent its modest fleet of nuclear bombers overseas. It was unable to travel deep into Russia and return home without air-to-air interceptors and mid-air refueling. According to French doctrine, before the last Armageddon attack, the planes would fire a final warning shot if France’s essential interests were in jeopardy. Recently, an Italian refueling jet became the first to join a French nuclear air patrol, demonstrating the type of little gestures that matter in the language of nuclear deterrence. Furthermore, in February, a British publication said that France was thinking about sending Germany nuclear weapons delivered by air.
