Chapter 1: Life After Qatargate: A New Generation of Cleaner Lobbying?
The Qatargate bribery-for-influence scandal was and continues to be a shock to our system. Though only three sitting members of the European Parliament (EP) were implicated, it understandably has conjured memories of the European Commission’s 1999 mass resignation due to fraud, nepotism and mismanagement. One EP member has blamed Qatargate on some “bad apples,” but the affair runs the risk of leaving a permanent stain on Europe’s political leadership.
Given how blatantly and inelegantly the scheme was carried out, it is easy to draw broader conclusions about the integrity of EU institutions, and the means and methods of political influence – illegal and otherwise. The bribes flowed undetected for at least three years, meaning the perpetrators found the risk-versus-reward calculation to be in their favour. They knew how to get away with it, indicating they understood the limitations of EU oversight agencies.
In December 2022 police found more than €1.5 million in cash in the homes of then-EP Vice President Eva Kaili, her boyfriend, a former MEP and a close circle of relatives and associates. Allegedly paid by Qatari agents, the bribe money was hidden in hollowed-out books, suitcases, a safe, hotels and even in the garbage. Kaili and several others were arrested in an operation overseen by police in Belgium, Greece and Italy.
Among other issues, Qatar was trying to influence EU visa-free travel rules, soften critical statements about the country and its human rights record, and improve its image leading up to the 2022 FIFA World Cup. A classic pay-for-influence scheme, Qatargate comprises the worst elements of political corruption – the very sort that the EU campaigns against in Europe around the world.
Chapter 2: German and Russian Lobbying: An analysis of the complexity of lobbying relations in national and European level
The Encyclopedia Britannica identifies lobbying as “any attempt by individuals or private interest groups to influence the decisions of government” (Britannica, 2024). Several actors engage in lobbying, state and non-state ones. In terms of state, this can be governments attempting to influence the policies of other governments or international organizations. We can separate the non-government ones into for-profit and not-for-profit ones. Corporations tend to have their dedicated department dealing with government affairs, which intersects with lobbying or hiring external expertise in the form of lobbying and public relations firms. Some other actors include non-governmental organizations, trade associations, chambers of commerce, think tanks, and research institutes. Both states and corporations make use of different lobbying actors to get their messages through and shape policies.
In this article, I focus on lobbying in Germany and Russia by providing an analysis of both countries and touching upon relevant legislation, actors, cases, and the lobbying dynamic between the two countries vis-à-vis one another. I aim to provide a more holistic view of how interest representation is regulated and utilized by different actors in Germany on the one hand, and how Russian organizations and the Kremlin engage with influence activities and lobbying both at the European Union level and at the national level in Germany, or other EU capitals. Through that, I highlight the power dynamics that develop
Chapter 3: The EU Response to Foreign Interference: Legal Issues and Political Risks
With the major corruption scandal dubbed ‘Qatargate’, the calls for re-estrictions on foreign interference in the democratic processes of the European Union (EU) have further intensified. While discussions had already gained momentum in the context of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, allegations that several members of the European Parliament (MEPs) accepted bribes from the government of Qatar in exchange for favourable voting behaviour and statements have given an additional boost to ongoing discussions on how to prevent foreign governments from unduly interfering in EU affairs. In the wake of ‘Qatargate’, observers and political groups in the European Parliament (EP) have suggested, inter alia, the need to increase transparency regulations, to introduce a registration obligation for foreign interest groups along the lines of the United States (US) Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), or to entirely ban foreign funding of lobbying efforts.1 Currently, the European Commission (EC) is working on a ‘Defence of Democracy’ package that explicitly aims at protecting ‘European democracy against covert foreign interference’. At the heart of this package is a FARA-like legislative initiative that would ‘introduce common transparency and accountability standards for interest representation services directed or paid for from outside the EU’.
Conclusion
The examination of Saudi and Emirati lobbying efforts within the EU highlights the significant role of soft power and strategic communication in contemporary international relations. Both countries have demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of how to navigate the EU’s political landscape and leverage various tools of influence. As the EU continues to play a crucial role in global politics, the lobbying activities of external actors like Saudi Arabia and the UAE will remain a critical area of study. These efforts not only impact bilateral relations but also influence broader regional and international dynamics.
Future research could explore the long-term effectiveness of these lobbying campaigns and their impact on EU policy decisions. Additionally, the evolving nature of soft power in an increasingly digital and interconnected world offers rich avenues for further exploration. Understanding the intersection of cultural diplomacy, economic interests, and political strategies will be essential for comprehensively analyzing the role of non-Western states in shaping global governance
