The Iran nuclear deal known as the JCPOA, which was reached in 2015, will formally expire in 2025. The agreement has been on life support since the US pulled out in 2018 under the first Trump government. Attempts to revive it or reach a longer and stronger deal have failed amid a trust deficit, the US ‘maximum pressure’ policy, and geopolitical and regional problems, especially the Gaza war.
With the expiration of the JCPOA, so will the few remaining enforcement measures that permit some pressure to be exercised on Tehran, including reinstatement sanctions, which can be imposed by any member of the United National Security Council (UNSC).
In the absence of the JCPOA and without an alternative deal, Tehran could decide to increase its nuclear programme to a greater extent. That possibility looks far more likely following a year that has witnessed Iran’s deterrent capability hardly undermined. Members of the Tehran-led ‘Axis of Resistance’ like Hezbollah and Hamas have been significantly depleted by their confrontations with Israel.
A critical quest for deterrence
Suddenly, Iranian policymakers are now discussing fervently the need to weaponise the country’s nuclear programme, even though Iran’s Supreme Leader continues to emphasise that the country’s programme will remain a peaceful one.
The March IAEA report noted Iran has grown its stockpile of highly enriched uranium by a significant 50 per cent. Iran has also significantly extended its nuclear programme: some Iranian policymakers will now consider that effort as even more essential, as the only way by which the nation can quickly regain some deterrent capability and supply the country with the ultimate security guarantee.
A need exists for an off-ramp
Taking all this into account, 2025 will be a crucial year for Iran’s nuclear programme and for wider Middle East regional security. In the absence of an off-ramp, Iran could rush to militarise its nuclear programme or be bombarded or both. Iran now witnesses negotiations with the US as a de facto acceptance of Trump’s resumed maximum pressure approach.
These consequences are what France, Germany, and the UK, also known as ‘E3, and the European Union, have been working hard to prevent since 2003, when they took the lead in talks, mediating between the US and Tehran in and trying to de-escalate uncertainties. The E3 and the European Union played a significant role as bridge builders for more than a decade, eventually resulting in the JCPOA’s signing.
When President Trump decided to withdraw the US from the agreement in 2018, the E3 and the European Union remained committed to its continuation, hoping to provide adequate incentives for Iran to remain obedient to its JCPOA obligations. Despite these endeavours, Iran suspended its compliance in 2019. Since then, intensification has been the name of the game. Bilateral relations between Iran and European nations have progressively declined.
However, neither party has a better chance than re-engaging, attempting to rebuild trust through a verifiable, strengthened deal. Iran now witnesses negotiations with the US as a de facto acquiescence to Trump’s resumed maximum pressure policy, a consequence it is not willing to take. However, it does not want a military confrontation either, and its economy is under ominous strain. What Iran wants, above all, is long-term sanctions ease in order to prevent the reimposition of sanctions and stop Israeli strikes.
Nevertheless, suppose Iran does not receive an off-ramp. In that case, Tehran will likely respond to maximum pressure, as was the case in 2019-2020 when it struck US targets, led strikes against vessels off the UAE coast, and backed proxy attacks on Saudi oil installations.
There is no doubt that it will be difficult for the E3 and European Union to devote the political will necessary to the task. Trump’s talks with Russia disorient them to conclude the war in Ukraine, his overturning of European security architecture and his tariff-focused trade policy.
The failure to act could lead to an even greater security challenge: a US-Iran policy which fails to include any input from Europe and, instead, potentially depends on Russia as a mediator. Tehran is already holding separate discussions with China and Russia to examine nuclear issues.
The E3 must take action quickly and decisively. The alternative is a pathway to nuclear or military confrontation that will make an already threatening European security environment even more complicated and far more unstable.
