During the last two months, the pro-Iran Iraqi militias have been using Iraqi soil to wage a fight in a larger battle against America and the Arab Gulf countries in the region. As part of “Islamic Resistance in Iraq” among others, these militias have been targeting American military installations, including its embassy in Iraq as well as launching drone and rocket attacks against targets located in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, and other Persian Gulf countries.
The number and regularity of such incidents have made what used to be occasional provocations across the border into an ongoing strategy to put psychological and economic pressure on the nascent warming up between Iraq and Gulf States. The alarming part about all of these is the apparent fact that most of these assets seem to be based out of Iraq, posing a question regarding Iraq’s capabilities or intentions to control Iran’s proxy organizations.
The number of drone and missile attacks by the Islamic Resistance Movement in Iraq is said to be around several hundred in just a few weeks’ time, with some reports suggesting the figure is near to one thousand when all actions in the wider area are taken into account. Half of the drone attacks on Saudi Arabia from late February 2026 are reported to have originated in Iraqi soil, highlighting Iraq’s position as a launching ground for Iran-sponsored drone warfare.
In Kuwait, militia groups that are backed by Iran have launched attacks on critical civilian infrastructures, like the country’s primary airport, while in Saudi Arabia, energy infrastructure facilities, such as the refinery in Yanbu, have been attacked using drones. However, it is crucial to note that these attacks are not merely random attacks but part of an overall strategy aimed at increasing insecurity and dissuading foreign investors from partnering with Gulf countries.
Iraq’s fragile hold over its own sovereignty
The official position of the Iraqi government is clear on this issue; it “categorically rejects” any attacks on Gulf countries and Jordan. The Iraqi leadership has been part of the condemnations issued by other regional governments against attacks launched from Iraqi territory, committing to safeguarding its neighbors from any armed overflow. However, the contrast between the official stance of Baghdad and the realities of the situation in Iraq speaks volumes.
Large segments of Iran‑aligned militias are embedded within, or operate alongside, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), effectively blurring the line between state‑linked armed groups and non‑state actors. Many of these groups retain direct channels to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which provides weapons, training, and strategic direction, even as Tehran publicly denies direct control over individual operations.
Iraq’s so-called Gulf reset was designed to indicate its move away from being dominated by Iran towards a more balanced economic relationship with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the rest of the GCC countries. This approach seemed promising since Baghdad entered into various agreements regarding energy and infrastructure with Riyadh, while Dubai began investing in Iraq.
However, the relentless drone and rocket campaign coordinated from Iraqi territory has tainted that reset, feeding suspicions among Gulf leaders that Baghdad either cannot or will not clamp down on Iranian proxies.
“If Iraq cannot control its own territory, it will bear the political cost,”
one Gulf diplomat remarked privately, echoing the broader regional view that failure to clean up Iran‑aligned networks will erode trust in Baghdad’s reliability as a security partner.
This impression has been further strengthened due to the interception of the majority of these unmanned planes being performed by the air defenses of the U.S. and the Gulf states, employing missiles that were much more expensive than the Iranian-made drones they had to shoot down. In light of the imbalance between the costs of defense and offense during this conflict, it may be surmised that Iran and her proxy forces are pursuing an attrition warfare strategy.
U.S. pressure and the call to dismantle Iran‑backed militias
In response, the US has engaged with a combination of both public calls and back-channel pressure aimed at Baghdad. In recent conversations with Iraqi authorities, senior US diplomats have been quite clear that it is now high time to disband any and all Iranian-backed militias active within Iraqi territory or else face the prospect of new rounds of sanctions and diplomatic isolation in the future. Further, the US has made it known that there could be sanction actions taken against those who support Iranian meddling, including some figures tied to the PMF.
The argument central to Washington’s stance is simple: a sovereign state cannot credibly rehabilitate its regional image while allowing foreign‑backed militias to use its territory as a launchpad for attacks on neighboring countries.
“You cannot be a partner in regional security while hosting networks that threaten your neighbors,”
a senior U.S. diplomat told Arab media outlets, underscoring the growing impatience toward Baghdad’s cautious posture.
It is evident from the American approach towards restricting some Iraqi forces, especially their military and paramilitary forces, and cooperating with Gulf countries to track down the locations from which drones are being launched from Iraq. However, it needs to be noted that all of this will only be possible if there is the willingness of Iraqis to cooperate in the matter.
Iran’s indirect but deliberate strategy
The Iranian influence in the operation is subtle but definite. The Iranians do not take ownership of each attack carried out by the drones, rather they make use of the cover provided to them due to their proxies. It is through these Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that the messaging of Tehran is amplified.
It enables Iran to send messages of determination to its own people and region without initiating a full-blown war with the United States or facing an immediate military challenge from the Gulf States. The attacks carried out by Iranian-backed militias are viewed as a response to the actions taken by the United States and Israel against Iranian interests.
In fact, the result of all such operations is only to aggravate the situation in the region, but not to bring about some clearly defined triumph. In particular, when urging Iran-sponsored groups to attack energy targets in the Gulf and even civilian airports and nearby American bases, Iran is counting on the fact that the cost of retaliation for Gulf countries would be greater than its value.
This is because it is assumed that Gulf states, which do not want to involve themselves in the full-scale war, and Iraq, whose authorities are limited by the power struggle within the country, will not start a military operation. Nevertheless, the risk of miscalculation is obvious, since each attack increases the probability of a conflict.
The Gulf states’ growing frustration
As far as leaders from Riyadh to Manama are concerned, the patience of the Gulf states is wearing thin due to what they regard as Iraq’s connivance—by design or inadvertence—in providing sanctuary for militias that are supported by Iran. It must be emphasized that the Saudis have made large-scale investments in Iraq to restore its economic infrastructure. As long as Baghdad cannot provide security along its borders and in the air, relations between the two countries are bound to sour further.
The message is clear: procedural condemnations are no longer enough.
“We cannot separate Iraq’s internal security from the stability of the entire region,”
a Saudi foreign‑policy advisor told a regional outlet, underscoring the degree to which Baghdad’s tolerance of Iran‑aligned networks is now viewed as a regional liability.
Both Bahrain and Kuwait have echoed these remarks, noting that Iraqi drones have been used to threaten their civilian and military infrastructure. Indeed, the bombing of the Kuwaiti airport brought about serious fears of the vulnerability of key transportation facilities, with possible mass casualties. It is claimed that, when combined with threats made by militia representatives, these attacks have contributed to an atmosphere of uncertainty, which adversely affects investment and planning processes. In light of this, the Gulf-Iraqi reset cannot move forward without any problems if one of the parties seems to harbor terrorists against the other.
Iraq’s internal political dilemma
From the perspective of Iraq’s leaders, however, the problem is not merely tactical but highly political in nature. Efforts to disarm and dismantle the Iran-backed militia groups would effectively jeopardize the delicate power-sharing arrangement in the country. The aforementioned factions enjoy considerable sway within the parliament, the security establishment, and the municipal administration, possessing sufficient military capability to mount a counterattack.
The Iraqi government is apprehensive about the potential risks that may arise from the aggressive campaign against the pro-PMF militias. On one hand, it may provoke an internal conflict that could undermine the legitimacy of the Iraqi government among its own citizens; on the other hand, the Iraqi government must address the growing pressure from both Washington and the Gulf.
The Iraqi authorities have tried to deal with this predicament by improving their border security, coordinating their air defense with the Americans, and making public statements that align themselves with regional condemnation of cross-border attacks. However, all of these actions seem largely to be symbolic acts without any real changes on the ground since there is no indication of major arrests, deactivation of rocket launch sites, or expulsion of prominent Iranian-backed individuals.
Iraqi leaders privately acknowledge that they lack the leverage to fully break free from Tehran’s orbit, but they also recognize that prolonged inaction will corrode their credibility with the Gulf.
“We are walking a tightrope,”
one Iraqi security official told a regional newspaper, capturing the sense of constrained agency that defines Baghdad’s current posture.
The long‑term implications for Iraq and the Gulf
A larger consequence of the Iran-backed campaign is that Iraq’s period of diplomatic rapprochement with the Gulf might be interrupted, if not undone entirely, should these incidents continue. Gulf countries, having made an initial investment in the reconstruction and incorporation of Iraq, are uncertain about whether Iraq can maintain the security and consistency they need. The idea that Iraq is serving as a launchpad for attacks backed by Iran further supports Gulf perceptions that Iraq is either a weak state susceptible to manipulation or a collaborator in Tehran’s agenda in the region.
